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 Competent persons have the legal right
to refuse treatment, even life-sustaining treatment,
and incompetent patients can also refuse treatment
through an advance directive, by naming a health
care agent to make decisions for them or by having




Competence is a legal construct, not a medical
or psychiatric one, and it is task-specific. People can
be competent to do one thing (such as refuse med-
ical treatment) but not another (such as stand trial
and participate in their own defense). Grisso and
Appelbaum capture the essence of incompetence as
follows: “Incompetence constitutes a status of the
individual that is defined by functional deficits (due
to mental illness, mental retardation, or other men-
tal conditions) judged to be sufficiently great that
the person currently cannot meet the demands of





Despite these well-understood principles, some
refusals of treatment by persons in state custody re-
main controversial. Most notably, these involve the
forcible administration of psychotropic drugs to a
person who is competent to refuse these medica-
tions for the purposes of making an accused person
competent to stand trial or of maintaining order in
prisons. Because any forced treatment of a person in
state custody confronts physicians with a potential
problem of “dual loyalty,” crucial issues in medical
ethics are at stake. All these issues were in play when
the Supreme Court decided the case of dentist
Charles Thomas Sell in the summer of 2003.
In the majority opinion written by Justice Stephen
G. Breyer, the Court describes Sell as a former prac-
ticing dentist who had “a long and unfortunate his-
tory of mental illness,” beginning with inpatient
psychiatric treatment in 1982 after he told physi-
cians that the gold he was using for fillings “had





casions he complained that various public officials
were trying to kill him, and in 1997 he told a law-
enforcement official that he had spoken to God and
that “God told me [for] every [Federal Bureau of In-




These beliefs, among others, led psychiatrists to di-




Shortly after making the comment about the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Sell was charged
with submitting false insurance claims. A federal
magistrate ordered a psychiatric examination, after
which the magistrate concluded that Sell was “cur-
rently competent” to stand trial but might have a
“psychotic episode” in the future. He released Sell
on bail. A grand jury later charged Sell (and his wife)
with mail fraud, Medicaid fraud, and money laun-
dering. In early 1998, the government claimed that
Sell was trying to intimidate a witness. The magis-
trate held a bail-revocation hearing at which he
described Sell’s behavior as “totally out of control,”
including “screaming and shouting,” using “per-





 Sell’s bail was revoked, and
in April 1998 the grand jury issued a new indictment
charging him with attempting to murder both the
FBI agent who had arrested him and a former em-
ployee who planned to testify against him.
In early 1999, Sell asked the magistrate to recon-
sider his competence to stand trial. He was exam-
ined at the U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners
in Springfield, Missouri. Thereafter, the magistrate
found him “mentally incompetent to stand trial”
and ordered that Sell be hospitalized for treatment
for up to four months, to determine “whether there
was a substantial probability that [he] would attain
the capacity to allow his trial to proceed.” The test
for competence to stand trial is whether the defen-
dant “has sufficient present ability to consult with
his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational un-
derstanding and a rational as well as a factual under-
the case against charles sell
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months later, the staff of the psychiatric facility rec-
ommended that Sell take antipsychotic medication.
Sell refused, and the medical staff sought judicial
approval to administer psychotropic drugs against
Sell’s will. This doctor–patient standoff is the sub-




The Supreme Court reviewed the lengthy medical
and procedural history. A reviewing psychiatrist at
the medical center held a hearing and authorized
forced administration of drugs, for two reasons: be-
cause Sell was “mentally ill and dangerous, and
medication [was] necessary to treat the mental ill-
ness; and so that Sell would ‘become competent for





In the fall of 1999, the magistrate who had sent
Sell to the medical center held a hearing at Sell’s re-
quest and heard testimony that Sell had approached
one of the nurses at the medical center, “suggesting
that he was in love with her,” and “criticized her for
having nothing to do with him.” The medical cen-
ter’s physicians testified that, given Sell’s diagnosis
and current beliefs, this behavior “indicated that he





was moved to a locked cell. A year later, the magis-
trate concluded that Sell was “a danger to himself
and others at the institution” and that “antipsychot-
ic medication [was] the only way to render him less
dangerous.” He also concluded that the benefits of
these drugs “far outweigh[ed] any risks” and that
drug treatment was the only way likely to render
Sell competent to stand trial. He therefore ordered
forced medication, but he stayed the order so that




A district court judge determined in April 2001
that the magistrate’s finding of “dangerousness”
was “clearly erroneous,” noting that Sell had been
returned to an open ward. Nonetheless, the judge
found that forced use of antipsychotic drugs was
“medically appropriate” and that it was the only “vi-





 A year later, a divided court of appeals
panel agreed that Sell was not dangerous (noting
that his behavior “amounted at most to an inap-
propriate familiarity and even infatuation with a
nurse”). Focusing only on the fraud charges (not the
attempted-murder charges, which the court de-
clined to consider because it thought the threats may
have been simply a manifestation of his delusional
disorder), the court ruled that the government has
“an essential interest in bringing the defendant to
trial” that justified using forced treatment so long




The Supreme Court agreed to hear Sell’s appeal
of this decision in order to determine whether the
“forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to
render Sell competent to stand trial [would] uncon-





The Court based its decision on two prior Supreme
Court cases, one involving forced medication of a
prisoner, the other forced medication of a defendant











 the Court decided that a prisoner’s right
“to avoid the unwanted administration of antipsy-
chotic drugs” could be overcome if the state could
demonstrate that forced drug treatment was “rea-
sonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
Such interests did not include using drugs as pun-
ishment but did include using them to maintain or-
der in the prison environment. As for due process
in making this assessment, the Court concluded
that no judicial review or legal representation was
required — only the determination by physicians
that the drugs were in the inmate’s best medical
interests. In the words of the Court’s ruling, “an
inmate’s interests are adequately protected, and
perhaps better served, by allowing the decision to
medicate to be made by medical professionals rath-















review of a trial court’s authorization of the forcible
administration of psychotropic drugs to a defen-
dant accused of murder so that he would be com-
petent to stand trial. The Court ruled that the state
could overcome the defendant’s liberty interest in
avoiding forced medication only if it could demon-
strate an “essential” or “overriding” state interest
and that rendering a person accused of murder com-
petent to stand trial might qualify as such an over-
riding interest. Due process required that the pros-
ecution demonstrate to a judge that “the treatment
with antipsychotic medication was medically appro-
priate and, considering less intrusive alternatives,





 The Court reversed Riggins’s con-
viction, because the trial court had not taken into
sell’s mental condition
precedents
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account the possibility of trial prejudice resulting
from the effects of medication, including the effect





 The defendant might, for ex-
ample, appear to the jury to be a calm, cold-blood-
ed killer owing to the effects of the medication.
From these two prior decisions, the Court summa-





Harper and Riggins indicated that the Con-
stitution permits the Government involun-
tarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a
mentally ill defendant facing serious crimi-
nal charges in order to render that defendant
competent to stand trial, but only if the treat-
ment is medically appropriate, is substan-
tially unlikely to have side effects that may
undermine the fairness of the trial, and, tak-
ing into account less intrusive alternatives, is





Applying these cases to Sell, the Court concluded
that a judge could order a defendant involuntarily
medicated for the sole purpose of making the de-
fendant competent to stand trial, if the judge made
four findings. The first finding is that “important
governmental interests are at stake.” These inter-
ests include not only bringing persons accused of
serious crimes to trial in a timely manner but also
making sure that the trial is a fair one. The second
is that the forced medication “will significantly fur-
ther” those state interests by making it “substan-
tially likely” that the defendant will be rendered
competent to stand trial and “substantially unlike-
ly” that the drug will have effects that could render
the trial unfair. The third finding is that the invol-
untary medication is necessary to further those in-
terests in that “any alternative, less intrusive treat-
ments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same
results.” The fourth is that the administration of the
drug is “medically appropriate, i.e., in situations in
the patient’s best medical interest in light of his
medical condition.” Different kinds of antipsychot-





The Court underscored that these four findings
applied only to forced medication intended to ren-
der a defendant competent to stand trial. The criteria
for these findings need not be met if the purpose of
forced medication is related to a prisoner’s danger-
ousness or to “the individual’s own interests where




The Court also noted that medical experts are likely
to be most persuasive on the issue of the usefulness
of particular drugs to control a patient’s potentially
dangerous behavior, whereas they will be less in-
formed about “the more quintessentially legal ques-




Because the district court judge had found Sell not
dangerous to himself or to others, and the appeals
court had agreed, the Supreme Court assumed that
Sell was not dangerous. On the basis of this assump-
tion, the Court overturned the decision of the ap-
peals court to approve the forced medication of Sell
“solely to render Sell competent to stand trial.” No
determination had been made by either the magis-
trate or the district court judge about the fairness of
a trial given the likely effects of specific drugs on
Sell, and this failure could have affected the deci-
sion. In the Court’s words, “Whether a particular
drug will tend to sedate a defendant, interfere with
communication with counsel, prevent rapid reac-
tion to trial developments, or diminish the ability
to express emotions are matters important to deter-
mining the permissibility of medication to restore
competence, but not necessarily relevant when dan-




 In addition, the
Court instructed the lower courts to consider the
fact that Sell had already been confined for a long
period of time and that this lengthy confinement




The order to medicate Sell forcibly was accordingly
vacated, and the case remanded for further pro-
ceedings.
This case has attracted wide interest for two main
reasons. First, it is about the power of the govern-
ment to administer drugs forcibly to persons who
are competent to decline medication solely to further
a governmental interest and not for their health.
Second, the treatment involved is aimed at changing
the mental functioning of a person and thus raises
the issue of whether drugs that affect the brain
should be considered in a different way from drugs
that affect other parts of the body.
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As to the government’s power to compel medi-
cal treatment of a competent adult, virtually all
commentators and courts agree that such power
can be legitimately exercised only in extremely lim-
ited circumstances. Harper, which involved the treat-
ment of a potentially dangerous prisoner, is an ex-
ample of such circumstances.7,9 The importance
of Harper, however, is limited by the facts that states
have broad powers to ensure security inside pris-
ons and that the prisoners’ liberty rights are highly
circumscribed already. Sell, nonetheless, seemed to
expand the decision in Harper by permitting forced
treatment of someone who has only been accused
of a crime. On the surface, the four criteria estab-
lished by the Supreme Court may seem stringent.
However, the Court’s stated belief that there will be
circumstances in which a person charged with non-
violent crimes can be forcibly medicated in order to
make the person competent to stand trial means
that there are no defendants for whom forcible med-
ication is out of bounds as a matter of constitutional
law. This is probably why both sides in Sell claimed
victory.10
I agree with the Court’s assertion that there are
circumstances in which the state’s interest in actu-
ally having a trial is very important, but I do not be-
lieve that Sell’s case should qualify. One case that
might meet this test is that of Russell Eugene
Weston, Jr., who is charged with murdering two
U.S. Capitol police officers in 1998, in an incident
that was caught on videotape.11 But the important
state interest at stake still must be articulated. Be-
cause Weston is mentally ill and dangerous, for ex-
ample, he is likely to be civilly committed for a long
time — at least until he is no longer a danger to oth-
ers. Thus, a criminal trial is not necessary to pro-
mote public safety. Public retribution is important,
but it may not be important enough to justify forced
medication just for the sake of a trial.
Antipsychotic drugs can have serious effects, in-
cluding some that can undermine the fairness of a
trial. In this regard, Justice Anthony Kennedy argued
in a concurring opinion in Riggins that antipsychotic
medication should never be ordered for the restora-
tion of competence unless the state can demonstrate
that the medication would not alter the defendant’s
behavior in a way that might prejudice his or her
right to a fair trial. In Kennedy’s words, “if the de-
fendant cannot be tried without his behavior and
demeanor being affected in [a] substantial way by
involuntary treatment, in my view the Constitution
requires that society bear this cost in order to pre-
serve the integrity of the trial process.”8
The second reason this case has attracted atten-
tion is that it raises the question of whether drugs
that affect the mind (and consequently competence)
should be treated differently from drugs that affect
only bodily function. Sell’s supporters argued that
forced medication implicated Sell’s First Amend-
ment and Fifth Amendment rights to be free from
governmental control of his thoughts and emo-
tions, as well as his ability to communicate with his
lawyers. They invoked Orwell’s 1984 as an image
of government run amok and based on fear and
mind control, including the vision of “big brother”
determining how citizens should think. They also
cited the forced drugging of political prisoners in
the former Soviet Union and reportedly in China
today.12
The American Psychiatric Association, on the
other hand, took the position in its amicus brief, as
it had in Riggins, that “antipsychotic medication
should be treated [just] like other medication.”13
Were these medications treated as all others are,
however, they could never be forced on a competent
patient. In fact, the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion is almost alone in its basic position that seri-
ously mentally ill patients should be forcibly med-
icated as a matter of course, if necessary, to put them
on the road to recovery. The problem with this ar-
gument is that psychotropic medication is not
just like other medications, because the brain is
not just like any other organ. Brain function deter-
mines competence, and only psychotropic medi-
cations have the potential to make a person compe-
tent to stand trial. The Court quite properly rejected
the American Psychiatric Association’s argument
on this point.
All these considerations are based on the as-
sumption that an accurate diagnosis has been made
and that the available medications have a reasonable
likelihood of restoring competence to stand trial.
Questions of diagnostic accuracy, treatment effica-
cy, side effects, competence, and informed consent
are all central to the role of physicians who are in-
volved in the forcible medication of accused per-
sons. In this case, there was credible psychiatric tes-
timony, summarized in the opinion of the court of
appeals, that questioned the strength of the evidence
of the efficacy of psychotropic medication in treat-
ing the type of delusional disorder that had been di-
agnosed in Sell.5 Even the psychiatrists who testi-
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fied for the state could not promise much success;
one said he had a 75 percent success rate, and the
other claimed only a 50 percent success rate.5
In Sell, as in Harper and Riggins, the Court accepted
the possibility of forced medication in limited cir-
cumstances, because the justices usually believe that
psychiatrists will only prescribe those psychotropic
medications that they consider to be in a defendant’s
best medical interests. The Court’s presumption is
that physicians would not act against the interests
of their patients, even their patients who are pris-
oners. Even psychiatrists such as Alan Stone, who
support forced medication that will restore compe-
tence in general, think it should be used only “to re-
store the person’s mental health” and not for the
“needs of the criminal justice system.”10
Similarly, a report by Physicians for Human
Rights on the problem of dual loyalty concluded
that “the health professional must place the protec-
tion of the patient’s human rights and well-being
first whenever there exists a conflict between the pa-
tient’s human rights and the state’s interest.”14 The
report is a bit vague, and professional standards are
often couched in ambiguous language. Thus, foren-
sic psychiatrists and prison physicians may feel that
they can determine what is appropriate behavior for
themselves in specific instances. They all may un-
derstand intellectually that the needs and interests
of the state’s criminal-justice system should never
be placed before the needs and interests of their in-
dividual patients. However, because of their own
identification with the state, which employs them,
they may be able to persuade themselves too easily
that the two are not really in conflict.9 As Justice
John Paul Stevens noted in a dissenting opinion in
Harper, prison psychiatrists are likely to have an in-
stitutional bias, and thus “the mere fact that a deci-
sion is made by a doctor does not make it certain
that professional judgment in fact was exercised.”7
The Supreme Court cannot resolve the forensic
psychiatrist’s dual-loyalty conflict; it has only high-
lighted the conflict by extending the circumstances
under which mentally ill persons who are compe-
tent to refuse medication can legally be forcibly
medicated. Nonetheless, psychiatrists can respond
by taking the Court at its word that competent adults
should not be involuntarily medicated solely for the
convenience of the state, even when such “treat-
ment” is judicially sanctioned. Drugs should be pre-
scribed by a physician only if the physician makes
an independent judgment that treatment is in the
patient’s best medical interests.
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